PEPORT OF AUDIT

Office of Data Processing

For the Period

1 July 1978 - 30 September 1980

#### SUMMARY

- 1. Financial controls, procedures and records of the Office of Data Processing (ODP) were in accordance with Agency regulations. Prior audit recommendations, with the exception of some pertaining to disaster recovery, were satisfactorily resolved. Minor administrative matters, including the need to better monitor prior fiscal year unliquidated obligations, were discussed with responsible officials and resolved during the audit. This report includes comments and recommendations concerning the following:
  - o formalizing the position of the Operations Security Officer
  - o completing a written disaster recovery plan for the two computer centers

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- o improving fire safety in the Special Center
- o implementing technical data security controls.

#### SCOPE

- 2. The audit included a review of administrative functions to evaluate the effectiveness of controls and procedures and to assure compliance with Agency regulations. Financial and logistical transactions were tested to determine that documentation, approvals and certifications were in accordance with applicable accounting and reporting requirements and to ensure that expenditures were within the scope of authorized activities.
- 3. The audit also included reviews and tests within both computer centers to determine that established procedures and other documentation were sufficient, adequate and followed to protect against potential

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security and safety risks. A survey of ODP/Applications was performed to identify the standards and procedures utilized for application systems development. Because the ODP is still in the process of revising their applications development standards, no tests were conducted to determine use or compliance with the standards.

#### BACKGROUND


- 4. ODP provides a central computer service to satisfy automatic data processing (ADP) requests from Agency components and to satisfy Intelligence Community requirements as assigned. In performing this service ODP had a personnel ceiling of to:
  - o review and coordinate Agency proposals for the acquisition of computer hardware (including word processing equipment), software, and services:

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- o operate two computer centers (Ruffing and Special)
  to provide facilities and services for batch and
  interactive computer processing, data base management,
  and on-line information storage and retrieval;
- o perform analysis of requirements for ADP services, develop and implement application systems, and perform maintenance and production control of completed application programs.
- 5. The ODP's operating budget for Fiscal Year 1980 is summarized as follows:



This represents about 54% of the Agency's budgeted Fiscal Year 1980 expenditures for ADP resources.





#### DETAILED COMMENTS

#### Operations Security Officer

7. During the audit numerous potential security weaknesses and safety hazards were observed in the two computer centers (primarily in the Ruffing Center). When these problems were brought to the attention of the ODP/Operations Security Officer, they were promptly corrected. The position of Operations Security Officer was established by ODP on a temporary basis to develop and implement a security awareness program for the two computer centers. By ODP's account the security awareness program is successful. The

continuous enforcement of security and safety practices is of vital importance to the Agency. The ODP should formalize the position of Operations Security Officer by making it a permanent position, by writing a job description, and by giving the incumbent clear lines of authority.

Recommendation #1: Formally designate a position as Operations Security Officer and have the incumbent report to the Deputy Director ODP/
Processing to ensure adequate authority to administer an operations security program.

#### Disaster Recovery Plan

8. The prior report of audit discussed the need for a disaster recovery plan to minimize the magnitude of service interruption in an emergency situation. ODP informed the Audit Staff that they would develop a methodology for determining the Agency's emergency ADP requirements; prepare and cost out a plan; and with higher management approval undertake the necessary preparation to execute the plan. The ODP has developed a disaster plan that relies on moving critical

applications to a surviving center. But ODP has not identified or prioritized the critical applications; planned for the move; nor tested the compatability of either computer center with the other's data. Until these steps are completed the current disaster plan can not be considered sufficient for actual use in an emergency.

Recommendation #2: Identify and prioritize the Agency's emergency ADP requirements and develop written operating procedures to ensure a successful exchange of applications between the two computer centers. Also provide for periodic updates and tests of the plan after development.

#### Fire Safety

Improvements in fire safety are needed in the Special Center. The Special Center is so filled with computer hardware and data storage material that in case of fire it is questionable if employees could make a safe and orderly exit from the center. Safe exit from the tape library is particularly doubtful. The ODP is aware of the problem, and have requested an architectual study to



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provide sufficient and adequate emergency exits. Until that study is completed ODP should continue to identify ways to improve fire safety within the Special Center.

Recommendation #3: Continue efforts to improve fire safety within the Special Center.

#### Data Security Controls

10. For many years the ODP has recognized that technical security controls to protect sensitive data were inadequate. In lieu of sufficient technical controls manual procedures were applied. Recently improved technical security control systems have become available. The ODP currently is installing one such system called Access Control Facility - 2 (ACF-2). The ACF-2 requires a prolonged and carefully coordinated implementation. Once fully implemented, ACF-2 should significantly improve the security of sensitive computerized data. No additional recommendation is required.

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